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ABSTRACT
The year 2003 provided a great deal of legislative, administrative and judicial
activity in the development of patent law. Legislation has been directed to
amending the Hatch-Waxman Act and abrogation of State immunity from
patent infringement. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has adopted
changes pursuant to recent amendments to the Patent Cooperation Treaty and
implemented an electronic filing system for patent applications. The Federal
Trade Commission has taken an interest in patents, particularly standard
setting technologies. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Festo, the
Federal Circuit has provided additional guidance for prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents. This article summarizes these and
other developments, and provides recommendations to patent practitioners on
how to operate with these new and exciting developments.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT LAW

2003

BRADLEY C. WRIGHT*

I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Medicare PrescriptionDrugImprovement and Modernization Act of2003

This Act is included in Title XI, Section 1101-1104 of the Medicare Prescription
Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003.1 Section 1101 of the Act amends the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 2 which sets requirements for an Abbreviated New Drug Application
("ANDA") to be filed with the FDA. Under Hatch-Waxman, ANDA applicants (usually
generic drug companies) may rely on the safety and effectiveness data contained in an
original New Drug Application ("NDA") if the ANDA applicant shows that the active
ingredients in the proposed drug are the same as the active ingredients in the previously
3
approved NDA and the proposed drug is bioequivalent to the approved drug.
An NDA applicant must identify any patent that claims the drug or a method of
using the drug. 4 The FDA then lists these patents in its "Orange Book." The NDA
applicant must file for listing in the Orange Book any pertinent patents that issued after
5
the NDA is approved.
The new law amends the statute by prohibiting an ANDA applicant from amending
or supplementing its application to seek approval of a drug different from the listed drug
identified in the original ANDA.6 However, this prohibition does not apply if the
amendment or supplement only seeks approval of a different strength for the drug in the
original ANDA. 7 Under this new provision, the FDA must issue a definition of the term
"listed drug."
Under the old law, an ANDA applicant had to certify in its application, for each
patent listed in the Orange Book, one of four grounds for avoiding infringement liability. 8
One ground was that the patent "is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the new drug for which the [ANDA] is submitted." If the ANDA applicant

* Mr. Wright is a shareholder and registered patent attorney with Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., in
Washington, D.C. He is also a former law clerk to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
This Article is based on an address given at the 48th Annual Conference on Developments in Intellectual
Property Law at The John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois on Feb. 27, 2004. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the author and should not be attributed to his firm or clients.
I Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
2 Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984)
'321 U.S.C. § 355(j)(A) (2003).
Id. § 355(b)(1) (2003).
Id. § 355(c)(2) (2003).
6 Id. § 355(j)(2)(D)(i) (2003).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(D)(ii) (2003).
8 Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (2003).
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relies upon this certification, it must notify the patent owner and the owner of the
approved NDA application. 9 No time limit was specified for providing this notice.
Under the new law, notice must be given (1) if the certification is in the ANDA,
within 20 days of receiving notice from the FDA that the ANDA has been filed, or (2) if
the certification is in an amendment or supplement to the ANDA, at the time such
amendment or supplement is filed. 10 Once the patent holder receives this notice, the
patent owner is given 45 days to file a patent infringement suit against the ANDA
12
applicant.11 The filing of the certification constitutes an infringing act.
More importantly, the new law limits the 30-month stay period provided by 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Under the old law, if a patent owner filed an infringement suit
within the 45-day period, the FDA was prohibited from approving the ANDA until 30
months from the date the applicant notified the patent owner of the application. Under
the new law, the 30-month stay applies only to patents listed in the Orange Book before
a "substantially complete" ANDA is filed. 13
The new law also clarifies when the 30-month stay ends. Under the old law, the
stay would end if, before expiration of this period, (1) the court held the patent invalid or
not infringed, in which case the ANDA approval would become effective on the date of
the court decision. Under the new law, the stay period is determined by the following
rules:
(i) if, before expiration of the 30-month stay, the district court holds the patent
invalid or not infringed, the approval becomes effective on either the date the
court enters judgment or the date a settlement order or consent decree is
signed and entered by the court, stating that the patent is invalid or not
infringed;
(2) if, before expiration of the 30-month period, the court rules that the patent
has been infringed and, if the judgment is appealed, the approval becomes
effective on the date on which the appeals court decides the patent is invalid or
not infringed or the date a settlement order or consent decree is entered by the
appeals court stating that the patent is invalid or not infringed;
(3) finally, if, before expiration of the 30-month period, the court rules that the
patent is infringed and the judgment is not appealed or affirmed, the approval
becomes effective on the date specified by the district court under 35 U.S.C. §
27 1(e) (4)(A) 14
These changes to the law were prompted by alleged abuses of the 30-month stay
provisions, wherein certain pharmaceutical companies would add new patents to existing
drug applications, prompting the generic competitors to file additional certifications for
those patents, which in turn prompted the pharmaceutical companies to file additional
lawsuits, leading to new 30-month stays of FDA approval for the same drug. These
9 Id. § 355()(2)(B) (2003).
10 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,

117 Stat. 2066 (2003).

11Td.
12 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2002).
13

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003).

Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
14
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maneuvers had the effect of prolonging the period of time before which generic drugs
could be brought to market.
The new legislation also permits an ANDA applicant to file a declaratory judgment
action if (1) the 45-day period has expired without the patent owner suing for
infringement after receiving a certification, and (2) if the certification asserts
noninfringement, the notice must include an offer of confidential access to the ANDA for
15
the purpose of determining whether an action or infringement should be filed.

B. Appropriationsfor Agriculture, RuralDevelopment, Foodand Drug
Administration,and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year EndingSeptember 30, 2004
This Act contains a provision stating that "[n]one of the funds appropriated or
otherwise made available under this Act may be used to issue patents on claims directed
to or encompassing a human organism."

16

C. IntellectualPropertyProtectionRestorationAct of2003
This bill would apply the patent statutes (as well as the copyright and trademark
statutes) to "abrogate State sovereign immunity in cases where States or their
instrumentalities, officers or employees" infringe any of these statutes. 17 To accomplish
this, 35 U.S.C. § 287 would be amended to include a new section providing that a state or
state instrumentality would not be entitled to any remedies for patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 284 (utility patents) or 35 U.S.C. § 289 (design patents), absent proof
that the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for infringement
of any federal intellectual property law. 18 This limitation on remedies would not apply if
(1) it would materially and adversely affect a legitimate contract-based expectation in
existence before January 1, 2004, or (2) the party seeking remedies was a bona fide
purchaser of the patent and, at the time of purchase, did not know that the State had
formerly been the owner of the patent. The legislation was intended to legislatively
overrule the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, which ruled that states could not be sued for
patent infringement because they had not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit. 19

15 Id.
16

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (2004).

17Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2344,

108th Cong. (2003).
18

d.

19527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999).
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D. (Proposed)Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003
This proposed bill 2 was introduced to overrule the Federal Circuit's decision in
OddzOn Products,Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 21 In that case, the Federal Circuit ruled that
activities under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (derivation of the invention) could be used under the
statute to invalidate a patent on grounds of obviousness. 22 In other words, allegedly
collaborative projects between two companies could create unintended prior art because
the work of one company could be treated as "prior art" under § 102(f) as to the inventive
entity named on the patent.23 Various universities testified in favor of overturning this
ruling.
The bill would have amended § 102(f) to exclude activities under that section from
being used as prior art in determining obviousness under § 103. In response to various
objections, the bill was amended to instead change § 103(c) to provide that (1) subject
matter and inventions owned by parties to a joint research agreement would be deemed
owned by the same person, thereby falling within the § 103(c) exclusion, and (2) the time
for determining applicability of this exclusion would be the applicable patent filing date
rather than the date of invention.24 The bill has been received in the Senate and referred
25
to the Committee on the Judiciary.

E. (Proposed)Jobs Growth and Tax Act of 2003
This bill would amend 26 U.S.C. § 170 (I.R.S. code), to limit charitable deductions of
intellectual property, including patents. 26 Currently, deductions are permitted for
charitable contributions, with the amount of the deduction equal to the fair market value
of the contributed property on the date of the contribution. 27 Criticism has arisen over
the past year stemming from questionable valuations of patents donated to charitable
organizations, such as universities. If enacted, this provision would limit the tax savings
realized by taxpayers (including corporations) when donating patents to non-profit
institutions.

F. (Proposed)U.S. Patentand TrademarkFee ModernizationAct of2003
This bi11 28 would change the patent fee structure (for large entities), as follows:
20

Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (Create) Act of 2003, H.R. 2391, 108th

Cong. (2003).
21 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
22

Id.

Id.
21 Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (Create) Act of 2003, H.R. 2391, 108th
2

Cong. (2003).
25 The current status of bill H.R. 2391 is available on the Thomas Legislative Information
website at http://thomas.loc.gov.
26 Jobs and Growth Tax Act of 2003, S. 2, 108th Cong. § 364 (2003); Jump Start Our Business
Strength (Jobs) Act, S. 1637, 108th Cong. § 495 (2003).
27 26 U.S.C § 170 (2003).
28 Patent and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. 1561, 108th Cong. (2003); Patent
and Trademark Fee Modernization Act of 2003, S. 1760, 108th Cong. (2003).

[3:229 2004]

Developments in Patent Law 2003

* Application fees for utility patents would be reduced from $750 to $300.
* The fee for each independent claim in excess of 3 would increase from $84 to $200;
the fee for each claim in excess of 20 would increase from $18 to $50; and the fee for an
application containing a multiple dependent claim would increase from $160 to $360.
* Additional fees would be charged if the application is examined; the examination
fee would be $200 for a utility application, $130 for a design application, $160 for a plant
patent application, $200 for the national stage of an international application, and $600
for a reissue application.
* Issue fees would increase from $1,300 to $1,400 for a utility or reissue patent,
from $470 to $800 for a design patent, and from $630 to $1,100 for a plant patent.
* Appeal fees would increase from $320 to $500 for filing the appeal, $320 to $500
for filing an appeal brief, and $280 to $1,000 for requesting an oral argument.
* Time-extension fees would increase from $110 to $120 for the first month, $300 to
$330 for the second month, and $520 to $570 for the third month.
* Maintenance fees would increase from $890 to $900 at 3 1 years, from $2,050 to
$2,300 at 7 12 years, and from $3,150 to $3,800 at 11 1 years.

I. PTO REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

A. Revision ofPatent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)Application Procedures
The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") adopted final rules relating
to Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT") applications, effective January 1, 2004.29 Among
other things, the amendments improve coordination of the international search (Chapter
I of the PCT) and international preliminary examination (Chapter II of the PCT), and
30
simplify the designation of countries, fees, signatures and other filing requirements.
The changes add to the Chapter I procedure the written opinion prepared during
the Chapter II procedure by the International Preliminary Examining Authority
(IPEA).31 The International Searching Authority (ISA) will be responsible for preparing a
preliminary and non-binding written opinion on whether the claimed invention is novel,
includes an inventive step, and has industrial applicability. If a Demand for
international preliminary examination is timely filed, the ISA's written opinion will be
deemed to be the IPEA's written opinion. If, however, a Demand is not timely filed, the
ISA's written opinion will form the basis for issuance by the International Bureau on
behalf of the ISA of an International Preliminary Report on Patentability, which will be
sent to all designated Offices and made available for public inspection 30 months from
the priority date.
The time limit for filing a Demand for international preliminary inspection has been
changed. Now, the Demand must be filed by the later of (1) three months from issuance
29January 2004 Revision of Patent Cooperation Treaty Application Procedure, 68 Fed. Reg. 67805
(Dec. 4, 2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
30The changes are contained in 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.14(g)(1)(ii) and g(3), 1.413, 1.421, 1.431, 1.432, 1.434,
1.445, 1.455, 1.480, 1.481, 1.482 and 1.484. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.424 and 1.425 have been deleted.
3137 C.F.R. § 1.484 (2004).
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of the international search report and the ISA's written opinion (or, if a search cannot be
made, of the Article 17.2(a) declaration), or (2) 22 months from the priority date. Any
arguments or amendments in response to the ISA's opinion must be submitted within
the time limit for filing the Demand to ensure consideration by the IPEA.
Payment of the international preliminary examination fee and handling fee is not
required until the later of one month from the filing of the Demand or 22 months from
the priority date. 32 If the IPEA and ISA are the same, and the IPEA wants to start
examination at the same time as the international search, the IPEA may require
payment of the examination and handling fee within one month of invitation for payment
by the IPEA.33

Upon filing a PCT application, the applicant will obtain automatic coverage for all
designation countries available under the PCT, including national and regional patent
protection. 34 Similarly, the mere filing of a Demand will constitute the election of all
designated states. 35 Applicants no longer need to designate individual countries at the
time of filing. The automatic designation provisions avoid problems for applicants who
neglect to designate at the time of filing the PCT application.
The fee system has been changed to a single international filing fee (including a first
fee component for up to 30 sheets and a second fee component for pages over 30). This
eliminates the requirement of a "basic fee" and a "designation fee," each of which was due
at different times in different amounts, depending on when they were paid.
Because of the automatic designation system, applicants/inventors must be named
in the PCT application. To avoid problems in obtaining signatures of all applicants, PCT
Rule 26 has been amended to provide that, for purposes of Article 14(a)(i), the PCT
application will be considered as signed if the request is signed by at least one
applicant. 36 If the PTO is the Receiving Office, this information must be provided for at
least one applicant who is a citizen or resident of the United States.
The
designated/elected Office may, during the national stage, still require confirmation of the
PCT application by the signature of any applicant who has not signed the Request and
37
any missing identifying information.
PCT Rule 90.4 has been revised to permit the Receiving Office, ISA or IPEA to
waive the requirement for a power of attorney, except where the applicant initiates
38
withdrawals under PCT Rule 90his.

B. Elimination of CPA Practicefor Utility and PlantPatentApplications
The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 provided for continued examination
("CPA") of a utility or plant patent application at the applicant's request (request for
continued examination or RCE). Since continued prosecution applications are largely
redundant in view of RCEs, the PTO enacted a rule eliminating CPA's. This amendment
32 Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, Rules 57.3(a) and 58.1(b), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct-regs.pdf (last visited April 9, 2004).
:'.3Id. at Rule 57.3(c).
-3 Id. at Rule 4.9.
'3 Id. at Rule 53.7.
:' Id. at Rule 26.2bis (a).
'37 Id. at Rule 51bis 1(a).
'S Id. at Rule 90.4.
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became effective July 14, 2003. It amends 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(d)(1) to provide that CPA's
may be filed only for design patent applications. If an improper request is made for a
CPA, it will be treated as an RCE.

C.ElectronicMaintenance of Official PatentApplication Records
Effective July 30, 2003, the PTO adopted rules as part of its 21st Century Strategic
Plan to implement beginning-to-end electronic image processing of patent applications.
The changes facilitate electronic image data capture and processing, streamline the
39
patent application process, and simplify and clarify the pertinent rules of practice.
The new system, referred to as the Image File Wrapper ("IFW") system, uses digital
image technology to replace paper processing of patent applications. The papers for
patent applications will be scanned into electronic files, and all processing and
examination by the PTO will be conducted with the electronic files. Because application
files will be stored in electronic format, they can be viewed by the public through the
PAIR system.

D. ProposedRule Changes to Implement the PTO's 21st Century StrategicPlan
40
The PTO published proposed rules to implement the 21st Century Strategic Plan.
Among other things, the changes allow electronic signatures on various submissions,
streamline the requirement for incorporation by reference of prior-filed applications, and
clarify the requirements for claiming small entity status.

E. ProposedRule Changesfor PracticeBefore the PTOBoardofAppeals
The PTO published proposed rule changes relating to practice before the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences. 41 A new Part 41 of the Rules would be adopted for the
purpose of consolidating and simplifying the rules relating to Board practice. The
purpose of these amendments is to improve procedures governing Board proceedings and
to reflect case law and legislative changes since the last significant changes.

F. ProposedRule Changes for Representation of Others Before the PTO
The PTO has proposed sweeping changes governing the right of patent agents and
attorneys to represent others before the PTO. Among other things, the proposed rules
would: 1) add new fees to fund periodic examination of registered attorneys and agents
on a continuing basis, 2) establish a continuing education program for all registered
39Changes to Implement Electronic Maintenance of Official Patent Application Records, 68 Fed.
Reg. 38611 (June 30, 2003) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
10 Changes To Support Implementation of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 21st
Century Strategic Plan, 68 Fed. Reg. 53816 (Sept. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
I1 Rules of Practice Before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, 68 Fed. Reg. 66648 (Nov.
26, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1, 5 and 41).
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practitioners, 3) permit the PTO to examine financial records of a practitioner, and 4)
42
expand the right of the PTO to conduct disciplinary investigations.

III. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENTS

A. Patentability,Validity, andProcurement

1. Written Description
In Moba, B. V v. DiamondAutomation, Inc., a claim that recited a step of lifting
eggs from a moving conveyor belt was adequately supported by the written description,
which showed that the inventor was in possession of that limitation as of the filing
date. 43 In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader criticized the use of the written description
44
requirement to police anything other than priority issues.

2. On -SaleBar
In Lacks Industries,Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded a ruling that the patented invention was on sale more
than one year before the filing date, because the district court applied the wrong
standard for determining whether there was a commercial offer for sale. 45 Applying its
2001 decision in Group One, 46 which looked to the Uniform Commercial Code to
determine whether an offer was legally binding, the Federal Circuit stated that the court
should look at industry custom and practice to determine whether Lacks's solicitations
rose to the level of a commercially binding offer for sale. 47 In her dissenting opinion,
Judge Newman criticized the deviation from a uniform standard for determining
whether an offer constitutes an invalidating offer for sale, stating that "remand for the
purpose of ascertaining that industry practice is at variance with Pfaff and its
48
implementing precedent."
In Minton v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., a patent for a
computerized securities trading method was held to be invalid because more than one
12 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 68
Fed. Reg. 69442 (Dec. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts 1, 2, 10 and 11).
43 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
'4 Id. at 1322 (Rader, J., concurring).
d5 322 F.3d 1335, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
46 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001). "[O]nly an offer which
rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale, one which the other party could make into a binding
contract by simple acceptance (assuming consideration), constitutes an offer for sale under § 102(b)." Id.
at 1048.
47 Lacks, 322 F.3d at 1347.

[3:229 2004]

Developments in Patent Law 2003

year before the filing date, Minton leased a computer program that carried out the
patented process. 49 The court distinguished its earlier In re Kollar 0 decision on the basis
that Kollarinvolved a mere transfer of technical information for a process that required
51
further development.

3. Enablement
In Plant Genetic Systems, N. V v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., the Federal Circuit held
that "pioneer" patents are not entitled to a lower standard of enablement than other
patents. 52 The Court upheld the district court's determination that the claimed
invention was invalid because the patent did not enable a person of ordinary skill in the
53
art to make the invention as claimed.

4. Anticipation
In Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc., a patent for an antihistamine
54
metabolite was anticipated by a prior patent for the underlying antihistamine.
Schering's prior '223 patent covers the compound used in its CLARJTINR
antihistamine. 55 Its later '716 patent covers a metabolite of the compound which differs
slightly from the compound shown in the original '223 patent.56 According to the Federal
Circuit, even though the metabolite was not specifically shown in the earlier '223 patent,
it was inherently disclosed in the patent because ingestion of the drug described in the
'223 patent would necessarily result in the creation of the metabolite claimed in the later
58
'716 patent. 57 Three judges dissented from the denial of an en banc rehearing.

5. Obviousness
In In re Peterson, the Federal Circuit upheld the PTO's determination that
Peterson's claimed invention, which recited a range of 1%to 3% rhenium and about 14%
chromium, was obvious over a prior art reference that showed a range of 0% to 7%

48 Id. at 1352 (Newman, J., dissenting); see generallyPfaffv. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67
(1998).
d9 336 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
50 286 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
51Minton, 336 F.3d at 1377.
25315 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
': id. at 1340.
54339 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (a metabolite is a compound formed in the patient's body
upon ingestion of a pharmaceutical), en bane reh'g denied,348 F.3d 992 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
5Id.

r6 Id.

Id. at 1381
58 Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 348 F.3d 992, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Judge Newman
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Lourie dissented from the denial of the petition for
rehearing en banc, and Judge Gajarsa would rehear the appeals en banc. -d.
57
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rhenium and 3% to 18% chromium. 59 According to the Federal Circuit, "[t]he normal
desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides
the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum
combination of percentages." 60 The inventor did not show any unexpected increase in
61
strength in the claimed range of 1% to 3%.

6. Admissions As PriorArt
In Riverwood InternationalCorp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., the fact that a patent was
listed on an Information Disclosure Statement did not constitute an admission that the
earlier patent was prior art.62 The Federal Circuit distinguished the CCPA's decision in
In re Nomiya63 as being limited to admissions concerning "prior art" invented by others
(i.e., not the inventor).64 In this case, one of the inventors on the patent at issue was an
inventor on the earlier patent, which did not in fact constitute prior art.65 The Federal
Circuit stated that "[wihile Nomiya and Foutstand for the proposition that a reference
can become prior art by admission, that doctrine is inapplicable when the subject matter
66
at issue is the inventor's own work."

7. Indefiniteness
In Honeywell International,Inc. v. InternationalTrade Commission, a claim was
held invalid for indefiniteness where the recited limitation of a "melting point elevation"
reaching a certain point could not be measured without knowing which of four different
known sample preparation methods was to be used, and the patent did not identify what
method should be used. 67 Depending on which method was used, a different number
68
would be obtained.

8. Double Patenting
In Geneva Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Glaxosmithkline PLC,several Glaxo patents
covering an antibiotic drug were held invalid for double patenting, even though the PTO
had allegedly issued a restriction requirement in an earlier application. 69 The Federal
Circuit held that an ambiguous examiner interview summary stating that "method of use
claims will go in a divisional application" did not constitute a clear restriction
59 315 F.3d 1325, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
6( Id. at 1331.
61 Id. at 1332.
(62 324 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
(3'3509 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
64 Rivertwood, 324 F.3d at 1354.
(5 IN. at 1355.
(36Id. at 1354; see generallyIn re Fout, 675 F.2d 297 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
637 341 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
68 Id. at 1336.
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requirement.7 0 According to the court, "restriction requirements must provide a clear
demarcation between restricted subject matter to allow determination that claims in
' 71
continuing applications are consonant and therefore deserving of § 12 l's protections."

B. InterpretationofPatents

1. Claim Construction
In Invitrogen Corp. v. BioerestManufaeturing.,L.P,a claim that recites a first step
of growing cells at a temperature of 18' C to 32' C was improperly interpreted to preclude
an additional step (prior to the first step) of growing cells at 37' C (i.e., foreclosing any
growth outside of the claimed range).72 During prosecution, the patent examiner had
stated that the 18' C to 32' C range was essential to the invention.7 3 In response, the
applicants amended the claim to recite that range and argued that the claimed range
avoided undesirable effects of growth at 37 ° C According to the Federal Circuit, this did
not preclude the applicant from asserting the claims against an accused method that
75
first applied growth at 37' C and then followed the claimed steps.
In Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., a district court erred by interpreting the
claimed term "bus interface unit" as being limited to a unit capable of functioning in a
command/response system. 76 Despite the fact that the specification highlighted the
command/response system in various objects of the invention, the Federal Circuit
adopted the ordinary meaning of the term, continuing its trend toward giving a "heavy
presumption" to the ordinary meaning of claim language.77 The court also stated that
components that were not necessary to perform a recited function of a means-plusfunction clause cannot qualify as "corresponding" structure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.78
In Kumar v. Ovonie Battery Co., although dictionaries can be an important tool in
claim construction by providing a starting point for determining the ordinary meaning of
a term, the Federal Circuit relied instead on a definition of the word "amorphous" that
was found in a prior art patent that was discussed during prosecution of the patent at
issue.7 9 The defendant had argued that the ordinary dictionary definition of
"amorphous" should be used.80 The Federal Circuit noted that the prior art patent was
considered part of the intrinsic record and contained a definition that was "to be

(9 349 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that 35 U.S.C. § 121 precludes use of one patent
against another if they resulted from a restriction requirement in the USPTO).
10Id. at 1380.
"Id. at 1381.
72

327 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

7:3Id. at 1369.

Id. at 1370.
,5Id.
76 325 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
7 Id. at 1355.
8 d. at 1350.
'9 351 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
0 d. at 1367.
,4

[3:229 2004]

John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

preferred" over the general dictionary definition.8 1 The patent specification did not
82
specifically define the term.
In Genzyme Corp. v. TranskaryotieTherapies,Inc., the applicant made an allegedly
broadening amendment to the claims after a final rejection, but did not provide any
explanation for the amendment, and the Federal Circuit concluded that it could not have
been a broadening amendment.8 3 The Federal Circuit pointed to PTO Rule 1.116, which
does not permit entry of amendments "touching the merits of the application" after a
final rejection unless the applicant makes a showing of good and sufficient reasons why
they are necessary and were not earlier presented.8 4 According to the Federal Circuit,
the examiner could not accept a second (supplemental) after-final
amendment broadening the scope of the rejected claims without formal
comment from the applicant. Under the applicable Patent Office Rules,
amendments to patent claims after final rejection cannot alter the
substantive scope of the claims without explanation about the necessity
of the amendment and without reasons for the delay in proposing the
85
change.
The court interpreted the phrase "chromosomally integrated" to require introduction of
86
exogenous -Gal A sequences into a host cell, and hence the patent was not infringed.
In Altiris,Inc. v. Symantee Corp., a method claim was held not to be limited to the
specific ordering of steps as recited in the claim. 87 The Federal Circuit vacated the
88
district court's conclusion that the specification implicitly required such an ordering.
On a second issue, the Federal Circuit ruled that despite the fact that the recited term
"boot selection flag" did not have a common meaning in the art, a proper meaning could
89
be determined by looking at the individual meanings of "boot," "selection," and "flag."
The Federal Circuit looked to dictionary definitions for these words and concluded that
"boot selection flag" referred to one or more bits of data or information indicating which
boot cycle had been selected. 90 As to another phrase, however, ("automation code"), the
Federal Circuit concluded that dictionary definitions of the words did not give any clarity
to the claim term, so resort to the specification was necessary to determine its meaning. 91
In Jansen v. RexallSundown, Inc., a claimed method for treating pernicious anemia
by administering folic acid and vitamin B12 "to a human in need thereof' was properly
limited to uses for patients who knew they were in need of treatment of pernicious
anemia. 92 The defendant marketed a product that fell within the language of the claim
except that it was marketed for maintenance of proper blood homocysteine levels, not for

81 Id.

at 1368.
at 1369.
82 346 F.3d 1094, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
84 Id. at 1103.
85d.
82 Id.

86 Id. at

1101, 1106.

318 F.3d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
88 Id. at 1372.
89 Id. at 1366. "Simply because a phrase as a whole lacks a common meaning does not compel a
court to abandon its quest for a common meaning and disregard the established meanings of the
individual words." Id. at 1372.
9 Id.
87

91 Id. at 1374.
92

342 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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treatment of anemia. 93 The Federal Circuit rejected the patent owner's argument that
94
all persons were "humans in need" of such treatment.
In Alloc, Inc. v. InternationalTrade Commission,claims that did not explicitly recite
"play" (space) between panels were nevertheless interpreted to require such "play,"
because the specification and prosecution history emphasized such "play."95 Judge Schall
96
wrote a lengthy dissent emphasizing the lack of anything in the claims implying "play."

2. Doctrine of Equivalents (Scope of Claims)
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., on remand from the
Supreme Court in light of Fest, the Federal Circuit again concluded that Space
Systems/Loral did not infringe the patent, but this time it applied the "all elements"
rule.97 In its original decision, the Federal Circuit held that the patent was not infringed
under the doctrine of equivalents because of prosecution history estoppel. 98 After the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of its ruling in Festo,the Federal Circuit
found a different reason to find the patent not infringed, invoking the "all elements"
rule. 99 According to the Federal Circuit, the district court erred by identifying the
claimed limitation as "rotating said wheel," rather than "rotating said wheel in
accordance with a predetermined rate schedule which varies sinusoidally over the orbit
at the orbital frequency of the satellite." 100 Given that this more specific limitation was
missing from the accused device, no infringement could be found. 101
In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Novopharm Ltd., the "all elements rule" was invoked to
preclude infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.10 2 The claim recited "a comicronized mixture of particles of fenofibrate and a solid surfactant." 10 3 The defendant
used a non-solid surfactant, and the court thus held that asserting equivalents
10 4
infringement would "vitiate that limitation altogether."

3. ProsecutionHistoryEstoppel
In Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., Pioneer was estopped from
asserting that its patent was infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 10 5 The Federal
9:3
Id.
94Id.
9 342 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003), on bane reh'g denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25565 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 17, 2003).
96Id. at 1375 (Schall, J., dissenting).
97 324 F.3d 1308, 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
98 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 249 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001), on
bane reh'g denied,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16600 (Fed. Cir. June 25, 2001), vacated andremanded, 535
U.S. 1109 (2002), recalledand appealreinstated,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15608 (2002).
9 Lockheed, 324 F.3d at 1321.
100 Id. at 1315.
101Id. at 1321.
102 323 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
103:Id. at 1327.
104 Id. at 1331. This case illustrates how a "limitation" can be as narrow as a single word.
105330 F.3d 1352, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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Circuit held that Pioneer could not rely on a declaration by the patent attorney to explain
that the narrowing amendment was "inadvertent."' 106 The Court stated that "only the
public record of the patent prosecution, the prosecution history, can be a basis for such a
reason [for the amendment]."107 The Court also rejected the argument that because the
amendment was voluntary, it did not give rise to estoppel.108 Finally, the court ruled
that Pioneer could not overcome the presumption that it had surrendered the alleged
equivalent, because the equivalent was well known at the time of the amendment. 109
In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu ilnzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., in this long-awaited
decision on remand from the Supreme Court, the en banc Federal Circuit clarified the
nature of prosecution history estoppel. 110 The Supreme Court had previously ruled that
amending a patent claim during prosecution did not necessarily create a complete bar for
purposes of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, although making a
narrowing amendment without any explanation would give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that the equivalent in question had been surrendered.11 1 The Supreme
Court had identified three circumstances in which the presumption could be rebutted:
(1) where the accused equivalent was not foreseeable at the time of the amendment; (2)
where the amendment bore no more than a "tangential" relation to the accused
equivalent; or (3) where "some other reason" prevented the patent owner from covering
the accused equivalent in the claims. 112 The Federal Circuit further developed the
Supreme Court's ruling, stating:
(1) whether the presumption of surrender had been rebutted was a purely legal
issue, despite potential fact issues regarding the level of skill in the art;
(2) specific factors to be considered in evaluating the rebuttal would be developed on
a case-by-case basis;
(3) unforeseeability is an objective inquiry relating to what a person of ordinary skill
in the art would have foreseen at the time the amendment was made;
(4) later-developed technology is generally not foreseeable for purposes of rebuttal;
(5) earlier-developed technology is likely to have been foreseeable; and
(6) a district court may hear expert testimony and consider extrinsic evidence
regarding whether an alleged equivalent would have been foreseeable, but "tangential
relation" and "some other reason" reasons should be determined based solely on the
11 3
prosecution history.
Additionally, the "tangential relation" reason could not be relied upon if the alleged
equivalent was present in the prior art that the amendment was intended to overcome.
The court remanded in this case to determine whether one of ordinary skill would have
thought that a single two-way sealing ring was an objectively unforeseeable equivalent of
11 4
two one-way sealing rings.
In Ranbaxy Pharmaeeutieals,Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., rewriting a dependent claim in
independent form in response to an examiner's objection was held to constitute a
106Id. at 1357.
107Id.
108Id.

loId.
110344 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
111
Id. at 1365.
112Id.
11:3
Id. at
114 Id. at

1367 70.
1371.
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narrowing amendment for purposes of prosecution history estoppel, and there was a
rebuttable presumption that the alleged equivalent was surrendered. 1 15 The Federal
Circuit concluded based on the evidence before it that the alleged equivalent (acetic acid)
was likely foreseeable at the time of the amendment, and the patent owner surrendered
1 16
coverage for the equivalent.
In Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., in one of the first decisions
issued after its revised Festo decision was released, the Federal Circuit held that
amending a claim to recite "a boiling point range of 121F to 345F" in the face of a prior
art rejection that showed a boiling point of 390F constituted a narrowing amendment
that surrendered coverage over an alleged equivalent that fell within the surrendered
range of 345F to 390F. 117 The court refused to remand to permit Talbert to introduce
new evidence in an attempt to overcome the rebuttal, concluding that the Festorebuttal
118
criteria could not be met.
In Deering Precision Instruments, LLC v. Vector Distribution Systems, Inc.,
although Deering narrowed its claims by canceling broader claims and substituting
narrower claims, the Federal Circuit remanded to determine whether Deering could
rebut the Festo presumption that the alleged equivalents had been surrendered. 119 The
court did not explain what evidence might be relied upon to rebut the presumption. 120

C. Enforcement of Patents

1. Ownership
In Regents of the UniversityofNew Mexico v. Knight, university faculty members
were held to have been contractually obligated to assign to the university their rights in
patents and patent applications, based on the university's patent policy and by conduct
indicating that the professors intended to be bound by the patent policy. 121 Two faculty
members assigned several patent applications to the University of New Mexico arising
from their work at the university. 122 However, they refused to assign several
continuation-in-part applications to the university. 123 The university brought suit

seeking a declaration of ownership based on breach of the university's Intellectual
Property Policy and a Co-Inventor Agreement. 124 The Federal Circuit concluded that one
of the faculty members had entered into a written contract that incorporated the
university's patent policy, and that the other faculty member was bound under the policy
11 350 F.3d 1235, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
116- Id. at 1241. The appeal was from the denial of a preliminary injunction, so presumably
additional evidence could be introduced during further proceedings in the district court.
117347 F.3d 1355, 1357-1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
118Id. at 1360.
119 347 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
120 Id.
121 321 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
122 Id. at 1114.
128, Id. at 1115.
124 ITd. at 1114.
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because, under New Mexico law, a written personnel policy may form an implied
5
employment contract. 12

2. Infringement Issues
In Integra LifesciencesI, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, Merck had conducted research using
patented peptides to identify new drugs. 126 Integra sued Merck, claiming its use
constituted patent infringement. 127 Merck defended that its use of the patented peptides
was exempt from infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which was intended to permit
generic drug companies to begin testing drugs to enter the market after patent
expiration. Relying in part on legislative history, the Federal Circuit held that Merck's
activities did not fall within the § 271 exemption. 128 Because Merck's research was not
directly related to submitting information to the FDA concerning a particular drug, but
was instead directed to identifying new drugs, the exemption did not apply. 129 Judge
13 0
Newman dissented, arguing for a common law research exemption from infringement.
In BayerAG v. HouseyPharmaceuticals,Inc., information generated overseas using
a patented process and then "imported" into the United States was held not to constitute
a "product" for purposes of infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g).131 Housey claimed
that Bayer used Housey's patented method to identify a pharmacologically active agent
and then "imported" that information into the United States. 132 The Federal Circuit
concluded that § 271(g) was limited to manufactured physical goods, thus excluding
133
intangible information.

3. Implied License
In Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., a patent owner who sold female connectors
intended to be mated with male connectors necessarily granted an implied license to its
customers to practice the claimed invention, which required both male and female
connectors. 134 Anton/Bauer's patent claims recited both a "flat male plate" and a "flat
female plate." 135 Anton/Bauer makes and sells both female plates and battery packs
containing male plates. 136 Instead of selling the combination, however, it sells female
plates to video camera manufacturers, and sells the male plates separately. 137 The
defendant sold battery packs containing only a male plate that can be used with

Id. at 1128.

1'25
126

331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

127 Id.
128
129
1:30
1l
132

12

Id. at 868.
Id. at 867.
Id. at 872 (Newman, J., dissenting).
340 F.3d 1367, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1369.

Id. at 1368.

134329 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

-d. at 1346.
-d. at 1347.
1:27Id.
135

IN
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Anton/Bauer's female plates. 13 8 The Federal Circuit held that Anton/Bauer could not
proceed under an induced infringement or contributory infringement theory, because its
customers had an implied license to use the patented combination, and without any
direct infringement there could be no contributory or induced infringement by PAG.139

4. Damages
In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, a jury award of $15 million in
reasonable royalty damages was vacated and remanded. 140 The Federal Circuit found
that the damages analysis was flawed because (1) reliance on a previous license entered
into by Merck with another company was improper because it did not involve an
analogous level of risk; and (2) the amount of damages was nearly the entire value of a
141
company that Integra had purchased, which included many other patents.

5. UnenforceabilityDue To ProsecutionLaches
In the closely watched case of Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical,
Education & Research Foundation,bar code manufacturers representing more than 90%
of the bar code reader industry sued the Lemelson Foundation to stop it from suing
hundreds of companies over patents that claim priority back to the 1950s. 142 One major
defense raised by the bar code manufacturers is that Lemelson's patents are
unenforceable because of "prosecution laches"-in other words, undue and unexplained
143
delays at the patent office.
On January 23, 2004, the district court ruled against Lemelson, concluding that all
of his patents were unenforceable due to "prosecution laches." 144 In particular, the court
noted that Lemelson's 18 to 39-year delay in filing the asserted claims after they were
first disclosed in 1954 and 1956 was unexplained and unreasonable. 145 The court found
that Lemelson held the U.S. record for longest pendency of patent applications. 146 An
appeal is expected.
The "prosecution laches" defense was first explicitly recognized by the Federal
Circuit a year ago in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education &
1 47
Research Foundation.
The equitable doctrine of laches can bar enforcement of a
patent that issued after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution, even
though the patent applicant complied with the patent statute and rules.1 48 The Federal
Circuit concluded that enactment of §§ 120 and 121 of the patent statute, which
1S

Id.

Td. at 1345, 1353.
140331 F.3d 860, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
M39

141Id. at 872.

142 No. CV-N-99-397-PMP, 2000 WL 33709453, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 21, 2000).
143-d. at *18.
144301 F.Supp. 2d 1147, 1154-55 (D. Nev. 2004).
145Id. at 1157.
146 ITd. at 1156.
147277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
148 -d.at 1366.
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permitted continuation and divisional applications to receive the benefit of an earlier149
filed patent application, did not foreclose application of prosecution laches.

6. Willful Infringement
In State Contracting& EngineeringCorp. v. CondotteAmerican Inc., even though
the defendant did not produce an opinion of counsel as to non-infringement or validity, it
reasonably relied on a belief that it had the right to practice the invention based on the
agreement it had with the State of Florida, which was a licensee of the invention. 150 The
court stated that obtaining the opinion of counsel is not necessarily the only way to avoid
15 1
a finding of willful infringement.
In Knorr-Bremse Systeme FuerNutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., the Federal
Circuit sua sponte decided to hear this case en banc in order to clarify the circumstances
under which an adverse inference should be drawn against an accused infringer who
obtains legal advice but refuses to reveal that advice during litigation. 152 The court
identified four issues for further briefing, for which argument was heard in early 2004:
(1) whether it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to
willful infringement where the defendant invokes attorney-client privilege or
work product privilege;
(2) whether it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference when the defendant
has not obtained legal advice;
(3) if the law regarding adverse inferences is changed, what are the
consequences to this case; and
(4) should the existence of a substantial defense to infringement be enough to
153
defeat a charge of willful infringement, even if no legal advice was obtained?

7. Inequitable Conduct
In Dayco Products,Inc. v. Total Containment,Inc., the fact that a different patent
examiner rejected similar claims in a different but related patent application can be
1 54
material to patentability and thus factor into an inequitable conduct determination.
In this case, the applicant's patent attorney failed to disclose a different examiner's
rejection of claims in a copending patent application. 155 The Federal Circuit concluded
that this was material information: "We hold that a contrary decision of another
examiner reviewing a substantially similar claim meets the Akron Polymer reasonable
examiner' threshold materiality test."1 56 However, the Court remanded for a
149

Id.

150 346 F.3d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
151 Id. at 1064.
152 344 F.3d 1336, 1336 37 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
15:3Id.
154 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
155 Id. at 1361.
156 Id. at 1368; Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed.

Cir. 1998). "In Akron Polymer, under facts substantially similar to the facts here, the court determined
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determination of intent to deceive, which was lacking in the record. 157 The Court
15
declined to resolve which standard for materiality should be applied. S
In Hoffmann -La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., inventors who used past tense in a
patent application to describe an experiment that had never been performed potentially
committed inequitable conduct. 159 The patent application described an example
procedure for repeatedly refining a bacterial culture. 160 The example used past tense
phrases such as "[aictive fractions with no detectable nucleases were pooledand run ....
The results show a single 88 kd band ....
Example VI was found to be free of any
contaminating Taq endonuclease and exonuclease activities." 161 The past tense was used
more than seventy-five times in explaining the protocol. 162 The inventor later admitted
that he had never performed the example as described. 163 After concluding that the
disclosure constituted misrepresentation, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
finding that it was material and that it was intentional, since the inventors provided no
explanation as to why the past tense was used. 164 However, the Federal Circuit vacated
165
and remanded because some of the other district court findings were not upheld.
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-PoulencRorer,Inc., a patent on the TAXOL®
cancer drug was held unenforceable because the applicants failed to disclose to the
Patent Office an article that was published by the inventors. 166 Although the article was
not prior art, it cast doubts on the enablement of the claims because it stated that certain
chemicals relied upon in the patent application were unstable. 167 Although the patent
examiner had independently uncovered the article, he did not place his initials on the
form indicating that he had considered the article. 168 The applicants' French patent
agent knew about the article but failed to provide it to the Patent Office or to the U.S.
169
patent attorney.

8. UnjustEnrichment & PatentPreemption
In University of ColoradoFoundation,Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., a claim for
unjust enrichment based on filing a patent application for an invention that was
attributable to another person was not preempted under the patent laws.1 7 0

The

that the requisite intent could not be inferred because the patentee did "disclose the existence of the [the
second] application to the [first] application's examiner, and thus put the PTO on notice of the
copendency of the two applications." Dayeo, 329 F.3d at 1366.
157 Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1368.
158 Id. at 1363-64 (under the old rules, the "reasonable examiner" test was applied; the new rules
adopt a "prima facie case of unpatentability" or "refutes or is inconsistent with a position that the
applicant takes" standard).
159 323 F.3d 1354, 1363-66 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
160 Id. at 1364.
l 6d.
1
at 1365 (emphasis added).
162 Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
16,3

Id.

164 Id. at 1367.
1'6 Id. at 1372.
166

326 F.3d 1226, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Id. at 1234.
168 Id. at 1236.
169 Id. at 1231.
1'7

170

342 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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defendant incorporated confidential materials from the plaintiff into a patent application
and obtained a patent without listing the plaintiff as an inventor.171 The plaintiff was
awarded millions of dollars in damages under an unjust enrichment theory.17 2 The
Federal Circuit concluded that the claim was not preempted under the patent law,
because it did not create new patent rights or extend the scope of federal patent rights to
cover otherwise unpatentable ideas.17 3 Unlike the boat hulls involved in the Supreme
Court's Bonito Boats decision,17 4 the invention in University of Colorado was
175
patentable.

9. Procedure
In PandrolUSA, LP v. Airboss Railway Products,Inc., a party did not waive an
invalidity defense by failing to raise it in response to a motion for summary judgment of
infringement. 176 Although the Federal Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment
for infringement, it vacated the district court's ruling that Airboss had waived the
affirmative defense of invalidity by failing to raise it in response to Pandrol's motion for
1 77
summary judgment.

10. Patentsin Standard-SettingOrganizations
In Rambus Inc. v. Infineon TechnologiesAG,the Federal Circuit overturned a jury
verdict that Rambus committed fraud under Virginia law by failing to disclose to a
178
standards-setting organization that it held patents relating to memory devices.
179
Rambus participated in JEDEC, a standard-setting body in the electronics industry.
JEDEC had a written patent policy encouraging the adoption of standards free of
patented items, and requiring members to disclose patents and patent applications
"related to" the standardization work of its various committees.18 0 The Federal Circuit
interpreted the patent policy to require disclosure only if a license under the patent
claims was required to practice the standard.18 1 Judge Prost dissented, concluding that
the patent policy contained a broader disclosure requirement.182

173

Id. at 1300.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1307-08.

174

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).

175

Id. at 1307.

171

172

176 320 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
177 Id. at 1369.

318 F.3d 1081, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1085.
180oId.
181 Id. at 1100.
182 Id. at 1118 (Prost, J., dissenting).
178

179
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11. Standing to Sue for Infringement
In ParadiseCreations,Inc. v. UVSales, Inc., a corporation lacked standing to sue
for patent infringement because, at the time it obtained an exclusive patent license and
filed the lawsuit, it was administratively dissolved under Florida law for failing to file its
annual report.18 3 The Federal Circuit upheld dismissal of the lawsuit even though
Paradise had been reinstated as a corporation after the lawsuit was filed.18 4 According to
18 5
the Federal Circuit, standing must be present at the inception of the lawsuit.

12. State Immunity from PatentInfringement
In Regents of the University ofNew Mexico v. Knight,after the University of New
Mexico brought suit against two faculty members to force them to assign certain patents
developed while at the university, the faculty members filed counterclaims for
compensation under various theories.1 8 6 The district court dismissed the counterclaims
as being barred under the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity clause.18 7 The
Federal Circuit vacated the decision, concluding that by filing suit in federal court the
university waived its sovereign immunity with respect to all compulsory counterclaims
(i.e., those arising from the same transaction or occurrence), and remanded to the district
court for a determination as to which counterclaims should be reinstated. 188

13. Hatch-Waxman Act
In Warner-LambertCo. v. Apotex Corp., it was held not to be an act of infringement
to submit an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA') for approval to market a drug
for a use that was not covered by an existing patent.18 9 Warner-Lambert obtained FDA
approval to market its patented drug for use in treatment of seizures in adults with
epilepsy.1 90 Warner-Lambert also had a second patent covering use of the same drug for
use in treating neurodegenerative diseases.1 9 1 Apotex filed anANDA seeking approval to
market a generic version of the drug for the treatment of epilepsy after WarnerLambert's first patent expired.1 92 Warner-Lambert sued, alleging that Apotex would
induce infringement of its second patent directed to treating neurodegenerative diseases
with the drug. 193 The Federal Circuit held that Warner-Lambert could not assert
infringement by alleging that the generic manufacturer would induce infringement of
315 F.3d 1304, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id.
185 Id. at 1308.
186 321 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
183

184

187 Id.

at 1124.

188Id. at 1127.
189316 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003); seegenerally35U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2) (2003); 21 U.S.C. § 321

(aa) (2003).
190 Warner-Lambert,316 F.3d at 1352.
191 Id. at 1351.
1 2 Id. at 1352.
193 d. at 1353.
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one of its other patents that did not cover the use for which the generic drug was being
194
approved.
In Allergan, Inc. v. Aleon Laboratories,Inc., the Federal Circuit held that the owner
of a patent for a non-FDA approved method of using a drug cannot sue a generic drug
manufacturer for infringement based on the generic manufacturer's filing of an ANDA
that seeks approval for a use different from that claimed in the patent. 195 Allergan's two
patents cover a method of using an unpatented drug for (1) protecting the optic nerve
and (2) neural protection. 196 Neither of these uses of the unpatented drug had been
approved by the FDA.197 Alcon submitted an ANDA to the FDA seeking approval for a
generic use of the unpatented drug to reduce interocular pressure, a use not claimed in
Allergan's patents.19 8 Allergan sued, claiming that Alcon's proposed use would induce
infringement of its patents because doctors would prescribe the drug for Allergan's
patented uses.1 99 The Federal Circuit held that this case was controlled by its earlier
decision in Warner-Lambert(see above), and that Allergan could not base a claim on
200
uses not approved under the asserted patent.
In Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, the court found that the FDA was not required to
substantively review patents before listing them in its "Orange Book." 20 1 SmithKline
had listed one of its patents in the Orange Book with respect to one of its FDA-approved
drugs. 20 2 After a generic competitor filed a request with the FDA to produce a generic
version of the drug, SmithKline listed additional patents in the Orange Book with
respect to the drug and sued the generic competitor for patent infringement. 203 The
competitor sued the FDA to force removal of the additional patents, claiming that they
did not cover the drug that was originally approved by the FDA. 204 The Federal Circuit
held that the FDA's regulation, under which it did not substantively examine Orange
Book listings, was reasonable in light of the fact that the Hatch-Waxman Act did not
20 5
require the FDA to examine the listings.

D. FTCAetions Involving Patents

1. Rambus
The FTC has filed an antitrust case against Rambus, charging that the company
deceived an industry standard-setting organization by failing to disclose that it held key

194

Id. at 1362.

195324 F.3d 1322, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
196
197

Id. at 1324.
Id.

198 Id.

199
Id. at 1329.
200

Id. at 1334.

201347 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see generally 21 U.S.C 355 § (e)(2) (2000).
202

Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1349.

20,

Id.

204

Id. at 1340.
1352.

205Id. at
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patents involving memory technology. 20 6 This case was dismissed on February 24, 2004
by an administrative law judge, but is being appealed. 20' In a related case, the Federal
Circuit held that Rambus did not commit fraud under Virginia law by failing to disclose
208
the patents.

2. Unocal
The FTC filed a complaint against Unocal in March 2003, alleging that its actions in
not disclosing its patents to the California Air Resources Board during its rule-making
for reformulated gasoline were anticompetitive. 2 9 Unocal's patents broadly cover
cleaner-burning gas mandated by California.

3. Sehering-Plough, Upsher-Smith,American Home Products
On December 8, 2003, the FTC ruled that the companies above had entered into
illegal agreements to delay entry of lower-cost generic drugs for Schering's prescription
drug K-Dur 20, used to treat low blood-potassium levels. 210 Schering and Upsher settled
patent infringement litigation under an agreement by which Schering, the patent owner,
paid Upsher $60 million in exchange for Upsher's agreement not to enter the generic
market for the drug until four years later, even though the thirty month stay caused by
the patent litigation would have ended years earlier. 211 The FTC found that this was
anti-competitive. 212 A similar agreement between Schering and American Home
213
Products was also found to be anti-competitive.

4. The FTC's "White Paper"
The FTC issued a report entitled To Promote Innovation: The ProperBalance of
CompetitionandPatentLawandPohey,which makes various recommendations, most of
which appear to have the effect of weakening patents by making them easier to
21 4
invalidate.

206 In re Rambus Inc., a corporation,Docket No. 9302, Federal Trade Commission (Feb. 23, 2004),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/index.htm (last visited April 13, 2004).

207Id.
208 Rambus
209

v. Infineon Techs., Inc., 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., a corporation,Docket No. 9305, Federal Trade Commission (March 4,

2003).

210 In re Schering-Plough Corp., a corporation,Docket No. 9297, Federal Trade Commission, 27
(Dec. 8, 2003).
211 Id. at 16.
212Id. at 169.
213. Id. at 170.
214

The ProperBalance of CompetitionandPatent Law andPolicy,A Report by the Federal Trade

Commission (October 2003), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/lO/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited

Apr. 6, 2004).
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V. HOW TO "FESTO-PROOF" YOUR PATENT APPLICATION
The Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kabushiki Co. held that
prosecution history estoppel applies to any claim amendment made to satisfy any
2 15
requirement of the patent statute, not just those made to avoid the prior art.
However, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's "bright line" rule, holding
that the estoppel should not completely bar assertion of equivalents infringement except
under certain circumstances. 2 1 6 In short, the Supreme Court held that the patentee
should bear the burden of showing that a particular amendment does not surrender the
particular equivalent in question, and that "[t]he patentee must show that at the time of
the amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a
claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent." 217 The Court
explained:
There are some cases, however, where the amendment cannot reasonably be
viewed as surrendering a particular equivalent. The equivalent 1) may have
been unforeseeable at the time of the application;2) the rationale underlying
the amendment may bearno more than a tangentialrelationto the equivalent
in question; or 3) theremay be some otherreason suggestingthat thepatentee
couldnotreasonablybe expected to have described the insubstantialsubstitute
in question. In those cases the patentee can overcome the presumption that
2 18
prosecution history estoppel bars a finding of equivalence.
Following the Supreme Court's Festo ruling, the Federal Circuit stated that
applicants may only rely on evidence in the public file history in order to rebut the
presumption of estoppel, and that extrinsic evidence such as an attorney's after-the-fact
affidavit would be inadmissible. 21 9 In that case, the Federal Circuit also reaffirmed the
principle that voluntary amendments, as well as amendments arising from a patent
220
examiner's rejection, could create estoppel.
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit further interpreted the
22
Supreme Court's opinion in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. 1
The Federal Circuit ruled that:
(1) whether the presumption of surrender had been rebutted was a purely legal
issue, despite potential fact issues regarding the level of skill in the art;
(2) the specific factors to be considered in evaluating the rebuttal would be
developed on a case-by-case basis;
(3) unforeseeability is an objective (not subjective) inquiry relating to what a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have foreseen at the time the amendment was
made;
215 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002).
216 Id.
217

at 737.
Id. at 749.

218 Id. at 740-42 (emphasis added).
219 Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 330 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[0]nly the
public record of the patent prosecution, the prosecution history, can be a basis for such a reason.").
22 Id.
221 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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(4) later-developed technology is generally not foreseeable for purposes of
rebuttal;
(5) earlier-developed technology is likely to have been foreseeable; and
(6) a district court may hear expert testimony and consider extrinsic evidence
regarding whether an alleged equivalent would have been foreseeable, but "tangential
relation" and "some other reason" reasons should be determined based solely on the
prosecution history.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit held that the "tangential relation" reason could not
be relied upon if the alleged equivalent was present in the prior art that the amendment
was intended to overcome. The court remanded to the district court to determine
whether one of ordinary skill would have thought that a single two-way sealing ring was
an objectively unforeseeable equivalent of two one-way sealing rings.
Other recent Federal Circuit cases have given an additional gloss to these
principles. In RanbaxyPharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
that rewriting a dependent claim in independent form in response to an examiner's
objection constitutes a narrowing amendment for purposes of prosecution history
estoppel, thus giving rise to a rebuttable presumption that the alleged equivalent was
surrendered. 222 The Federal Circuit concluded based on the evidence before it that the
alleged equivalent (acetic acid) was likely foreseeable at the time of the amendment, and
the patent owner likely surrendered coverage for the equivalent. 223 In DeeringPrecision
Instruments, LLC v. Vector Distribution Systems, Inc., Deering was found to have
narrowed its claims by canceling broader claims and substituting narrower claims.

224

The Federal Circuit remanded to determine whether Deering could rebut the Festo
225
presumption that the alleged equivalents had been surrendered.
Although there does not yet appear to be a post-Festodecision applying Festoin the
context of argument-based estoppel, it is this author's opinion that argument-based
estoppel will receive the same Festotreatment as amendment-based estoppel. There are
several pre-Festo cases where the Federal Circuit has made clear that it will treat
226
amendment-based estoppel and argument-based estoppel in the same manner.
The primary difference between argument-based estoppel and amendment-based
estoppel, however, is the circumstance that will give rise to the presumption. Under
Festo, a narrowing amendment made for a reason related to patentability will give rise
to a rebuttable presumption that the equivalent in question is barred. Argument-based
estoppel, however, does not arise unless the applicant made a "clear and unmistakable
surrender" of subject matter during prosecution. 227 Presumably, the question in
222350 F.3d 1235, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
223 Id. at 1241. Because the appeal was from the denial of a preliminary injunction, additional
evidence could presumably be introduced during further proceedings in the district court.
224347 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
225Id.
2
26 See, e.g., Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Elkay Mfg.
v. Ebco Mfg., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Arguments made during the prosecution of a patent
application are given the same weight as claim amendments."); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 287 F.3d 1097
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding no estoppel but noting that argument-based estoppel and amendment-based
estoppel are treated interchangeably).
227 See, e.g., Eagle Comtronics Inc. v. Arrow Comm. Labs., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19150 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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argument-based estoppel cases would be whether the applicant could have crafted an
argument that would have avoided surrendering a foreseeable alternative.

V1. WHAT'S A PATENT PRACTITIONER TO

Do?

1. Conduct a thorough prior art search. Filing a patent application with claims
when you have no idea what is the closest prior art is like shooting in the dark. Although
it adds time and cost to the patent application, finding prior art before the examiner does
may avoid the need to make major claim amendments down the road. If your client does
not want to pay for a prior art search, conduct a quick keyword search on the free PTO
web site, and ask the inventor to provide you with copies of the closest prior art. A side
benefit of conducting a prior art search is that it may enable you to file a petition to make
228
special, expediting the examination of your patent application.
2. Use the prior art to identify alternative embodiments. Given the Supreme
Court's warning that estoppel may arise unless the equivalent was "unforeseeable," prior
art in the same field as the invention will likely be used against you as evidence in
litigation that a particular equivalent was foreseeable. Put the foreseeable variations
found in the prior art for the most critical inventive elements into your patent
application, and claim them. Recall Johnson &Johnston,where disclosed but unclaimed
229
embodiments are "dedicated to the public."
3. Ask the inventor to think ofallpossible alternatives.One technique is to ask the
inventor(s) to "design around" the broadest claim you have drafted, allowing you to
tweak it or add new claims to cover the design arounds. Again, this will increase the cost
of the patent application, both in attorney time and inventor time. Explain to the
inventors that if you do not perform this exercise, the patent may be worthless because
an infringer could get around the patent by using a "foreseeable" alternative for one of
the claimed elements. You do not want the inventor to admit on the witness stand that
he knew of a foreseeable alternative but never mentioned it to his patent attorney
because the attorney never asked him about such alternatives.
4. Make sure all embodiments and variationsare claimed. This is not strictly a
Festoproblem, but practitioners who disclose "foreseeable" alternatives must remember
230
to claim them, lest they will be waived.
5. Leave out "objectsofthe invention"andsimilardiscussions. Some practitioners
feel obligated to list or discuss in the specification various "objects" or "goals" of an
invention. The accused infringer will demonstrate that its device lacks some or all of the
"goals" listed in the patent in an attempt to show that it is substantially different or that
the patent is limiting. Although this does not directly implicate Festo, its effect is
23 1
similarly limiting.

228See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 708.02
(8th ed. 2003).
29 Johnson & Johnston Assoc., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
2'0 See id.
231 See, e.g., Unique Concepts Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (no infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents because one of the "objects" of the invention stated that it was intended to be
useful for a "do-it-yourselfer"); Alloc Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (relying
on "objects of the invention" to narrowly interpret the claims).
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6. Do not criticize thepriorartin the application. Criticism of a particular feature
in a patent application may prevent a patentee from reclaiming that subject matter
through the doctrine of equivalents. 232 Again, this is not strictly a Festo problem, but
nevertheless limiting statements in the specification can be treated as a form of estoppel.
7. Define and then use broad terminology for the claims. Rather than relying on
assumptions (including common usage and dictionary definitions) for terminology used in
the claims, define terms in the specification broadly and then use the broad terminology
in the claims. For example, rather than reciting that a method operates on a "file," you
can instead define an "object" as "a file, directory, collection of bits or data, or any other
grouping of information," and then use "object" in the claim rather than "file." This
avoids an infringer's argument that "file" has a narrow definition lacking an equivalent
in the accused device. It also avoids the need to show equivalence in the first place, thus
avoiding prosecution history estoppel.
8. Consider,but do not exclusively rely on, means-plus-function claims. Meansplus-function claims provide built-in equivalence that can be proved as literal
infringement, rather than relying on the doctrine of equivalents. Make sure you also
include other independent claims that do not rely on means-plus-function clauses.
9. Have a secondpatent attorney review the claims. No matter how experienced
you are, a second patent attorney with a fresh set of eyes may spot an unnecessary or
unclear limitation that you had not considered. Fixing problems and ambiguities before
the application is filed may avoid the need to amend the claims during prosecution.
Again, it will add minimally to the cost of drafting the application, but you can explain to
your client that doing so will result in a stronger patent.
10. Try to c"redefine "a claim limitation rather than charrowing" it. Given that
prosecution history estoppel only applies to narrowing claim amendments, try to
characterize amendments made during prosecution as "redefining" limitations made for
233
clarity only, rather than narrowing limitations made to avoid the prior art.
11. Appeal more often. This sounds obvious, but overturning an examiner's
rejection rather than acquiescing to a slightly narrowing claim may make a huge
difference in patent scope when the "slightly narrowing' amendments are scrutinized
under the microscope of litigation. The pendency of appeals at the Board of Appeals has
been significantly reduced in the last year or so, speeding up the appeals process. Recent
statistics also suggest that 30% of appeals are resolved in the appeal conference that
takes place before the file is transmitted to the Board of Appeals. Moreover, recent
statistics show that approximately 50% of all appeals to the Board result in at least a
partial victory for the applicant.

2 2 Schwing GMBH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Alloc
Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (pointing to criticism of the prior art in the
specification).
2:3:3
See, e.g., Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures Inc., 274 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(amending the claim term "output signals" to "output transform calculation signals" did not narrow the
claim, since it merely rendered explicit what was already implicit in the claim); Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc.,
274 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (fixing an antecedent basis problem in a claim did not constitute a
narrowing amendment for purposes of prosecution history estoppel); Turbocare Division of Demag
Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (explaining that a
newly added claim only "redefined" the small clearance position without narrowing the claim, and
prosecution history estoppel did not apply).
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12. Interview the patentexaminer before filing an amendment. If you can convince
the examiner that one out of a set of arguments or amendments is persuasive during an
interview, without reducing all of those reasons or amendments to writing, this leaves
you with the flexibility of only relying on those amendments or arguments in the
response that are likely to be persuasive with the examiner.
13. Swear behind a reference rather than arguing that the reference is
distinguishable. Removing prior art by showing that it is not "prior" avoids estoppel
altogether (i.e., no amendments and no limiting arguments).
14. Explain amendments as merely clarifying the scope of the invention, rather
than as being required to avoid the prior art. Leaving out an explanation will give rise to
a presumption that it was related to patentability, which may be virtually impossible to
overcome given that the Federal Circuit has limited such explanations to those that are
found in the prosecution history.
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